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Still the century of ‘new’ environmental policy instruments?
Exploring patterns of innovation and continuity
Andrew Jordana*, Rüdiger K.W. Wurzelb and Anthony R. Zitoc
aTyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK;
bDepartment of Politics and International Studies, University of Hull, UK; cSchool of
Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, UK
We re-examine the political interest in and use of ‘new’ environmental policy
instruments and other non-regulatory modes of governance. We start by
taking stock of the dynamic debate that has emerged around this topic
since the turn of the century. We then contextualise that debate by examining
subsequent challenges to, and transformations in, state-led governing and the
broader and widely acknowledged rise of ‘new governance’, highlighting the
mismatch between the animated discussion of new instruments amongst
policymakers and academics and the less active adoption and performance
of them in practice. We make an overall assessment of the role of instru-
ments – both ‘old’ and ‘new’ – in the wider debate about governance, and
suggest some promising steps that could be taken by both practitioners and
scholars better to understand and possibly even utilise more new environ-
mental policy instruments in the future.
Keywords: policy instruments; environmental policy; new instruments;
governance; policy innovation
Introduction
The editor’s invitation to revisit our original article (and related special issue) on
environmental policy instruments (especially Jordan et al. 2003a, 2003b) chal-
lenged us to investigate what had happened both to the everyday practices of
using ‘new’ environmental policy instruments (NEPIs) and to the ways in which
they and other new modes of governance had subsequently been studied by
academics. One of our primary motivations for assembling that special issue was
to shed light on the mismatch between what was at the time a rather animated
discussion of ‘new’ instruments amongst policymakers and certain academics
(but especially economists), and the less active and straightforward adoption and
use of them in practice (Keohane et al. 1998, Daugbjerg and Svendsen 2001,
Sterner and Coria 2012). This mismatch between policy innovation in theory and
continuity in practice was politically relevant because NEPIs had originally
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promised to address some of the well-known weaknesses associated with the
standard instrument of environmental policy – regulation. But it was academi-
cally important too. In the late 1990s, scholars had begun to make big, but (we
felt) empirically quite thin claims about the transformation of the state and public
policies in general. For us, studying instruments offered an empirically more
nuanced way to arbitrate between some of the grand truth claims that were being
made in relation to the relationship between government, which is still widely
seen as state-led governing via the ‘command-and-control’ instrument of regula-
tion (i.e. laws), and governance that relies instead on horizontal forms of societal
self-coordination (e.g. Jordan et al. 2005, Wurzel et al. 2013).
Was our perception of a mismatch entirely correct, and if so has the mismatch
become more or less pronounced since 2003? Certainly the academic study of
instruments in general (and NEPIs in particular) has boomed across many areas
includingpolitical science, law, economics, sociology and international development.
New journals such as Regulation and Governance have sprung up to meet the
demand. The topic of instruments has become enmeshed with a wider study of how
societies are governed and how states and state-like entities such as the European
Union (EU) have evolved in an era of ‘new governance’ (e.g. Kassim and Le Galès
2010, Héritier and Rhodes 2011). The lead article in our special issue was, we now
realise, in the forefront of efforts to get scholars in politics and policy fields to
re-engage with the topic of policy instruments, a field of policy analysis that had
originally emerged in the late 1970s (e.g.Majone 1978,Hood1983), but by the 1990s
had become somewhat isolated and becalmed. As such, the debate on environmental
instruments, which hitherto had been dominated by economists, has moved away
from the dominant – and rather narrow – focus on instrument design andmodelling in
rather hypothetical settings, towards a more holistic and interdisciplinary approach
that emphasises political processes and contextual factors in shaping the design,
calibration and actual usage of instruments in practice. Our original article attracted
a wide readership because, in addition, it drew upon and contributed to several other
instrument-related debates – on policy learning for example, policy transfer, policy
coordination (Jordan andLenschow2008) and policy innovation (Benson and Jordan
2011, 2012). Indeed these debates still excite us and many other scholars (e.g. Jordan
et al. 2005, Jordan and Schout 2006).
We are still struck, though, by the basic fact that the use of environmental
policy instruments in practice remains far less dynamic than the sometimes rather
animated debate amongst scholars and other policy specialists would suggest. In
other words, the basic mismatch that first motivated us to enter this field of
research remains as politically salient as it did in 2003. Yet as this field of
research has evolved, we have come to realise that the mismatch is in fact even
more complex and multifaceted than we first thought. Indeed from the very
outset, we were aware that the ‘new’ instruments were not colonising an empty
space and in some jurisdictions may in fact be rather ‘old’. This is one reason
why we were very careful to place the term ‘new’ in quotation marks, to indicate
that continuity and innovation are place- and time-specific.
156 A. Jordan et al.
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Here we try to bring the whole story up to date by reviewing and comment-
ing on the state of the art in policy instrument research. What, we ask, does the
current literature reveal about the mismatch between the way in which NEPIs are
debated and the way they are actually (not) used? Indeed, has the usage of NEPIs
actually tailed off in the last 10 years vis-à-vis traditional regulatory instruments
(in the face of a serious global recession and growing doubts about the efficacy
of self-governance), thereby widening the mismatch between instrument theory
and practice? Or was the whole debate about NEPIs, as we in fact cautioned in
2003, articulating a governance vision that was far more ambitious about the
scope for policy change than was evident in practice?
Our title harkens back to a seminal study of corporatism, a particular form of
interest intermediation between the state and interest group, which was published
at the very point in time when political interest in this style of governing was
receding across Europe (Schmitter 1974). Schmitter’s article triggered a substantial
burst of academic interest in corporatism and a flood of citations, but its practical
effect was rather less impressive because the everyday politics had already moved
in another, far more economically liberal direction. Ten years after the publication
of our special issue, are we still living in a century of ‘new’ instruments?
In order to start addressing this question, the next section revisits the key
elements of our original special issue, noting our main assumptions and motiva-
tions for producing it. The third section explores how both the academic debates
and policy practices have moved on in the last decade. Following on from Hood
(2007, pp. 133–137), Linder and Peters (1998) and others, we identify four areas
of literature, which gradually ascend in their level of abstraction. The first
focuses on the intrinsic nature of specific instruments, and includes the work
of scholars who champion a particular type of instrument as well as those who
seek to link particular instruments to specific policy problems (Linder and Peters
1998, pp. 40–41). The second is interested less in the nature of the policy
instruments themselves and more in the political dynamics which shape policy
instrument choices in practice. A third literature moves the focus onto the wider
political context which shapes and is shaped by many aspects of instrument
choice and use. Finally, we distinguish a fourth and final area of work that views
policy instruments as a useful prism through which to view changes in wider
shifts in governing. The fourth and final section of this paper examines the
analytical and academic challenges that confront the environmental policy instru-
ment agenda, together with an assessment of the everyday political challenges
that exist for practitioners trying to pursue it.
Why ‘new’ environmental policy instruments?
In the most general sense, policy instruments constitute the ‘myriad techniques at
the disposal of governments to implement their policy objectives’ (Howlett 1991,
p. 2). Put even more simply, policy instruments are the tools used to attain policy
goals (de Bruijn and Hufen 1998, pp. 12–13). Kooiman (2003, pp. 29–30,
Environmental Politics 157
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44–45) argued that policy instruments are the crucial bridge between the policy
frame or ‘image’ that informs how policymakers act and their efforts to govern.
Policy instruments usually embody particular policy philosophies, goals and
outlooks while providing concrete manifestations of policy actions (Hall 1993).
We do not want to give the impression that the political study of NEPIs
originated with our special issue. Several path-breaking works already existed,
which provided significant insights into the political aspects of instrument
design, specifically the importance of political and institutional context in shap-
ing instrument choices (most notably Majone 1978, Hood 1983, and Salamon
1989). Nevertheless, our volume succeeded in linking three different intellectual
developments, which exhibited their own distinct lacunae, at a particularly
appropriate point in time.
First, both practitioners and academics were taking a heightened interest in new
policy instruments during the 1980s and 1990s, but few were really focused on the
political implications of instrument design and selection, or the wider political and
institutional context in which NEPIs were (not) used in practice. In the realm of
practitioners, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) was busy publishing a series of papers that sought both to categorise the
main instruments in the tool kit and map out the emerging pattern of use and, in
doing so, cultivate political support for their use. This work had developed a head
of steam well before the publication of our volume, driven by a belief that
environmental policy and the economy more generally would be better if it were
transformed with innovative policy instruments (e.g. OECD 1991, 1993). Much of
it was written by environmental economists such as David Pearce, who, while
aware of the political dimensions of use, were more at home in the economic world
of rational economic agents and well defined preferences. Generally speaking,
studies by environmental economists (e.g. Baumol and Oates 1988) dominated
the work of the OECD. This work often had a rather narrow technical-instrumental
focus on particular market-based instruments. Institutional and political factors were
conveniently pushed to one side in an attempt to define and refine effective policy
designs. It is striking that only a few scholars really stopped to ask why so few of
the NEPIs were actually adopted in their textbook form (Keohane et al. 1998).
Meanwhile, in the EU context, academic attention initially centred on the relative
scarcity of NEPIs at the supranational level (Weale et al. 2000, pp. 458–460), or on
one particular type of NEPI such as voluntary agreements. This literature tended to
comprise of wide-ranging surveys of instruments or of non-cumulative case studies
of specific instruments (e.g. Andersen and Sprenger 2000).
Second, impressive typologies of policy instruments had emerged, but with-
out a strong empirical focus, although there were some notable exceptions (e.g.
Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1997). While originating in the policy sciences, this
scholarship also treated the selection of policy instruments as mostly technical
choices rather than political decisions (for reviews, see Peters 2002 and
Jordan et al. 2011), although there were some early and highly influential
exceptions (e.g. Hood 1983, Howlett 1991).
158 A. Jordan et al.
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The third academic push came from scholars interested in something far
broader, namely governance and its various modes. By the mid-1990s, the newer
modes – primarily associated with markets and networks – were proving espe-
cially attractive in contrast to the older, more hierarchical mode of government
(Jordan and Schout 2006), of which regulation was the best known and widely
used example. The governance ‘turn’ has since produced a wide range of works
(e.g. Rosenau 1992, Rhodes 1996). Scholars generally associated governance
with governments’ declining ability to steer and direct societal actors in a
hierarchical fashion using ‘command-and-control’ regulation (Pierre and Peters
2000, pp. 83–91, Palumbo 2010). Governments’ reduced steering capability
intersected with other prominent themes in the governance literature, such as
the increasing importance of multilevel decision-making arenas, the involvement
of more stakeholders and thus the formation of policy networks and/or net-
worked forms of governance, so as to arrive at more ‘collaborative’ policy
decisions (Benson et al. 2013). For us, the problem was that many of the claims
made in this literature seemed empirically under-specified. We hoped that an
empirical focus on instruments would provide a potentially valuable analytical
touchstone to open up and explore the changing role of the state in the new
governance.
Our 2003 volume explicitly sought to bridge the first two literatures, whilst at
the same time drawing attention to the potential links with the third: the wider
implications of instrument design and selection in the policy process (Jordan
et al. 2003a, 2003b). It posed four questions: What were the conditions that
affected the uptake of NEPIs? What were the overall patterns of use in different
political systems? How different was the deployment of NEPIs to the traditional
modes of governing in particular jurisdictions (i.e. the ‘newness’ or otherwise of
the NEPIs)? And could theories of comparative politics and public policy explain
the overall pattern of (non) use? (Jordan et al. 2003a, p. 5). It covered Austria,
Australia, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom.
We found that all of these countries had made substantive use of at least one
type of NEPI, which included market-based instruments (e.g. eco-taxes and
tradable permits), voluntary agreements, and informational measures (eco-labels
and environment management systems), although certain states were more inno-
vative, that is, following Walker (1969), willing and able to adopt policy instru-
ments that were not already an established feature of their pre-existing policy
repertoire. As a rough and ready benchmark, we compared the adoption of ‘new’
instruments against the pre-existing style, structure and content of their existing
policies. We quickly discovered that there was very little outright policy innova-
tion. Moreover, the same type of NEPI was often used for different reasons and
in different ways, with regulation often playing a dominant role. In other words,
everyday practice seemed to depart from the rather black and white pictures
painted by economists and an earlier generation of policy instrument scholars,
and the equally rarefied debate about the sudden onset of the new governance.
Environmental Politics 159
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These findings were, of course, meat and drink to scholars of comparative
politics. However, we also had a longer-term aim in mind: to bridge the study of
environmental instruments with the theoretical understanding of governance. The
study of instruments could, we suspected, help us to descend Sartori’s (1970,
p. 1040) ‘ladder of abstraction’ and understand how governance plays out in
relation to specific modes and instruments of governing. Indeed, much of our
subsequent work has sought to push at these broader questions (Jordan et al.
2005, Wurzel et al. 2013).
Taking stock: the debate about ‘new’ instruments
Where, when and by whom are they used?
The literature on environmental policy instruments in particular countries has
continued steadily since 2003, as has that focusing on instruments of society-led
governing (for a useful review, see van der Heijden 2012). Croci’s (2005)
volume brought together much of the thinking on how voluntary agreements
and eco-label schemes work. Brouhle et al. (2005) noted the large uptake of
voluntary approaches in the United States, but concluded that the evaluation of
their effectiveness was too limited to make definite judgements about their
usability vis-à-vis regulation. Dutch negotiated agreements are often held up as
the model of a systematic approach to voluntary agreements, and include detailed
monitoring requirements and sanctions that are normally absent from industry’s
self-declaratory commitments. But strong leadership from both business and
politicians is needed to achieve these wider objectives. Glasbergen’s (2004)
analysis came to similar conclusions about the ability of Dutch negotiated
agreements to improve energy efficiency, although he questioned whether more
than incremental reductions in carbon dioxide emissions can be achieved in the
absence of enforceable targets. What these studies showed is that, in the real
world, instruments interact with one another, often in politically very salient
ways. They feed directly into wider question of whether new modes of govern-
ance need to be seen in combination with the more traditional regulatory instru-
ments. In other words, to what extent are new modes of governance adopted in
the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Héritier and Rhodes 2011, Wurzel et al. 2013)?
Studies of other specific types of instrument have also stressed the impor-
tance of facilitating conditions and supportive political and institutional contexts
(Prakash and Gugerty 2010). Jordan et al. (2005), for example, have emphasised
the importance of government support for national eco-label schemes, such as
Germany’s so-called Blue Angel eco-label scheme, a pioneering scheme that
operates in a favourable domestic institutional context in which public environ-
mental awareness is relatively high. The role of contextual conditions has been
taken up and explored by many other scholars – on which more below.
Turning to another general category of instrument, notably the market-based
instruments, a similarly large literature has built up since 2003. As noted above, the
160 A. Jordan et al.
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uptake of emissions trading schemes – perhaps the most eye-catching NEPI of all –
has, to a significant extent, also been shaped by international regulatory agreements,
in the form of the 1992 framework convention on climate change. The 1997 Kyoto
Protocol to that agreement subsequently listed three flexible instruments, namely
emissions trading, the clean development mechanism, and joint implementation
(Wurzel 2008, Jordan et al. 2010, Wurzel and Connelly 2010). The United States
was the innovator on this occasion, not the states of Western Europe. It had gained
practical experience with sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions trading
schemes as long ago as the 1980s. Hansjürgens (2005) noted that this experience
provided a model for others. But what was the primary enabler of diffusion? It was
international regulation. As is now commonly known, the United States insisted –
against the resistance of the EU and its member states – on the inclusion of emissions
trading in the Kyoto Protocol. The EU only became a reluctant emissions trading
pioneer (van Asselt 2010) when it adopted the world’s first supranational emissions
trading scheme in 2003, which became operational in 2005.
The speed at which the EU emissions trading scheme was established stands
in marked contrast to repeated failures to agree EU-wide eco-taxes, another type
of market-based instrument. Additional momentum for an EU emissions trading
scheme was generated by member states (e.g. Denmark and the United
Kingdom) which developed their own national schemes ahead of EU-wide
emissions trading. Moreover, the imperative for the EU of hitting the greenhouse
gas emissions reductions target it had signed up for under the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol created pressures on the reluctant member states to accept emissions
trading as a novel policy instrument in EU climate change policy.
There are many notable studies by economists of emissions trading, but far
fewer have analysed the politics surrounding its use in practice (but see
Wettestad 2005, van Asselt 2010). Climate change and energy policy have
arguably sparked the greatest post-2000 spurt in new instrument use at the
national, supranational and international level. At the same time, however,
NEPIs seem to be less prevalent in other important environmental policy areas,
such as water regulation. NEPIs are also facing substantial criticism and negative
reaction. For example, Kerr (2007) found in his analysis of national climate
change programmes that governments made inflated claims about the effective-
ness of both their overall programmes and specific policy instruments. A
PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of 151 UK businesses concluded that almost
three-quarters believed command-and-control instruments were actually more
effective than newer instruments such as emissions trading and voluntary agree-
ments (ENDS Europe Daily 2007).
Finally, work on the final type of instrument – regulation – has continued.
Gunningham (2011) contended that a core part of environmental policy innova-
tion still takes the form of changes to and/or involving this traditional hierarch-
ical tool – a point to which we shall return later.
To conclude, the literature that has emerged since 2003 suggests that NEPIs
play a significant role in particular circumstances and/or for particular types of
Environmental Politics 161
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problems (e.g. emissions trading for reducing greenhouse gases). But their
adoption rate continues to vary between countries, with NEPIs being particularly
prevalent in certain sectors and/or countries. At the same time, assessments of the
effectiveness of such instruments remain rather few, as do those that assess both
the wider political context and overarching approach to governance in specific
political systems.
Why are they selected?
Scholars have continued to study the enduringly important question of what
actually drives the adoption of environmental policy instruments in the first
place. The policy innovation diffusion and transfer literatures have offered a
particularly coherent range of responses to this question. As conventionally
understood, a policy (instrument) innovation is something which is new to a
particular jurisdiction (Walker 1969). Policy diffusion is the ‘process by which
an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the
members of a social system’ (Berry and Berry 1999, p. 171). The policy
diffusion literature focuses on the patterns of adoption of an innovation as it
interacts with larger, structural forces.
Jordan et al. (2005) noted that the pioneering efforts of the aforementioned
German eco-label scheme led to the idea of eco-labelling being disseminated to
other countries. In a similar survey of a wide range of instruments (including,
eco-labels, national environmental plans and eco-taxes), Kern et al. (2005)
identified the presence of both sufficient national capacity (to adopt and imple-
ment the instruments) and adequate demand for these instruments as important
conditions for the successful transfer of policy instruments. Other enabling
conditions include the presence of pioneering countries, international networks
and the specific characteristics of the instrument in question. Tews et al. (2003)
suggested that the impact of international forums on policy instrument transfer
depends on the existence of transnational entrepreneurship and exploitation of
first mover strategies; the promotion of instruments by international actors such
as the EU can help provide national leaders with an external source of legitimacy
(Jordan et al. 2012a).
In contrast, policy transfer approaches examine the process by which knowl-
edge about policies, instruments and administrative arrangements operating in
one time and place are used at another time and/or place (Dolowitz and Marsh
1996) (for recent summaries, see Benson and Jordan 2011, 2012). Policy transfer
is normally conceived as occurring horizontally between states (or between
sectors or across time periods within one state), but regional and international
organisations provide additional significant opportunities for vertical movement.
One of the core questions for scholars of European public policy is what role
does the EU play? Bulmer and Padgett (2005) modified Dolowitz and Marsh’s
original scheme to elaborate a number of conceptual categories: emulation/copy-
ing, where a policy is transferred from one political system to another without
162 A. Jordan et al.
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alteration; synthesis, combining elements of policy from two or more different
jurisdictions; influence, a weaker form of transfer involving a policy system
taking inspiration from an external system but creating an entirely home-grown
version or building on existing domestic forms; and ‘abortive’ transfer, a blocked
attempt to transfer by actors in a given domestic context. Bulmer and Padgett
hypothesised the importance of hierarchy in achieving stronger and more endur-
ing forms of transfer. Negotiated governance will, they argued, tend to trigger
weaker forms of transfer, perhaps some synthesis and influence, while facilitated
unilateralism will at best lead to a weak form of mutual influence (Bulmer and
Padgett 2005, p. 106).
Jordan et al. (2003c) suggested that institutional dynamics in the EU may
lead to substantial policy emulation, but may often result in weaker forms of
transfer reflecting the bargaining process at the EU level and the vagaries of
member state transposition and implementation. Pedersen (2007, p. 71) placed
more emphasis on the subsequent process of legitimation, arguing that the eco-
tax innovation that occurred in Denmark, Norway and Sweden was less the
recognition of the idea of taxation (something that was well established already
in other sectors), but rather learning on the part of policymakers about how to
frame the instruments as being legitimate and rational. The knowledge itself was
less decisive, as prior experience with taxation gave experts ammunition for
those attacking the extension of eco-taxation (Jordan et al. 2012a). Nye and
Owens (2008) found two equally compelling reasons why UK industry was so
willing to embrace emissions trading: desire for a more amenable alternative to
the UK Climate Change Levy (i.e. tax and the implied threat of steadily more
stringent reduction requirements); and the desire to be ‘symbolically involved’ in
a voluntary trading scheme that included incentive payments and relatively little
financial risk.
To conclude, the public policy literature has made great strides in under-
standing how policy instruments move within and between different jurisdic-
tions. However, it has proven difficult to reduce what are in effect complex
combinations of factors into a small number of variables, a gap which may
eventually be filled by larger ‘n’ analyses. We return to this point in the next
section, which addresses the role of contextual factors. Finally, while most of the
diffusion- and transfer- inspired literature has tended to focus on the learners (or,
more often, policy entrepreneurs) in the policy instrument selection process,
Bomberg (2007) argued convincingly that one should also focus on the teaching
role played by environmental non-governmental organisations in new EU mem-
ber states.
Instrument selection: the role of contextual factors
There is a growing appreciation amongst instrument specialists of the need to
situate instrument choices alongside broader contextual factors that affect all
aspects of the policy process (e.g. Peters and Nispen 1998, Lascoumes and Le
Environmental Politics 163
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Galès 2007). These include institutions such as voting rules, dominant ideas and
policy paradigms, the political power of industry and, of course, other policy
instruments and their associated constituencies – in other words, the very ele-
ments that are the stock in trade of conventional public policy analysis. There is a
growing awareness that, together, these contextual conditions are likely to hold
the key to explaining the mismatch described earlier.
In this respect, Mol et al. (2000) have offered an elegant study of how both
deregulatory and ecological modernisation pressures are channelled through
domestic institutions in three EU member states (Austria, Denmark and the
Netherlands) and three policy sub-sectors (industrial energy efficiency, packa-
ging waste and the labelling of organic food products) for voluntary agreements.
They repeatedly emphasised the important role played by contextual factors. For
example, they discovered that the rigid, traditional meso-corporatist features of
Austrian environmental policymaking and the strong emphasis on consensual
policymaking have led to a comparatively low number of voluntary agreements
when compared, for instance, to the consensus-orientated politics of the
Netherlands (Mol et al. 2000).
In an attempt to cut through the thicket of cause and effect, Jordan et al.
(2012b) took the choice affecting variables identified by Linder and Peters
(1989), and related them to three main bodies of public policy theory: ideational;
institutional; and episodic (Jordan et al. 2003c). They argued that each theory
emphasises a slightly different aspect of ‘context’ in its relationship to choices.
Thus ideational approaches regard ideas as the main driver of change, and
institutional approaches argue that the institutional context in which instruments
choices are made is more important. Episodic theories suggest that instruments
are shaped by an unpredictable assortment of ideas, problems, solutions and
decision-making priorities jockeying for attention. Jordan et al. (2003c) used
these theories to offer different explanations for the EU’s selection of climate
change instruments. They found that none is sufficient on its own. Hence, the
EU’s ongoing struggle to govern by multiple instruments represents an ideal
context in which scholars of policy instruments and of the EU can engage in
mutually beneficial theory development and testing activities.
Heinelt and Töller (2001) offered a somewhat similar comparison, but
focused more on the uptake and implementation of two EU informational
instruments (environmental impact assessment and the eco-management and
audit scheme). Their explanation for national differences also centred on the
diverse national policy styles as well as national differences in the economic
structure (e.g. the size of firms) and interest group representation.
In their 2007 special issue, Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007, p. 11) claimed
that policy instruments can in turn uncover deeper, underlying changes in the
contextual conditions, a position which we adopted in 2003. This is because:
[p]ublic policy instrumentation reveals a fairly explicit theorization of the relation-
ship between the governing and the governed. In this sense, it can be argued that
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every public policy instrument constitutes a condensed and finalized form of
knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it.
In effect they suggested that analysts should turn their telescopes round and use
instruments to view changes in contextual conditions. A subsequent special issue
by Kassim and Le Galès (2010) developed this approach by using instruments to
investigate the multilevel political system of the EU. There, Halpern (2010, p.
54) examined policy instruments in EU environmental policy while arguing that
the EU has ‘a tendency to import policy instruments from other political systems
in order to legitimise its environmental policy competence’. In effect, they
remind us that policy innovations are not invariant: they are continually rein-
vented as they are adapted for use in particular contexts.
One other important aspect of ‘context’ that should not be overlooked is that
concerning other policy instruments. We are now much more aware that any
attempt to study NEPIs should be sensitive to pre-existing patterns of instrumen-
tation. In their edited volume, Héritier and Rhodes (2011) argued that new modes
of governance usually emerge in the shadow of hierarchy. Gunningham (2011)
has also convincingly argued that efforts to improve the implementation of
regulation – his primary focus – do not follow a single strategy either. Instead,
policy actors adjust their own particular circumstances as well as their own
capabilities and motivations. In doing so, he suggested a mixed (or hybrid)
approach of combining instruments and fitting them to the prevailing context
(see also Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). Whether this equates to a more nifty
approach to policy design or just plain old muddling through, is an open
question.
Instruments, government and governance
Building on the discussions described above, many scholars have tried to relate
the study of instruments to changing patterns of governance more generally,
particularly as revealed through the adoption of new modes of governance (e.g.
Héritier and Rhodes 2011, Wurzel et al. 2013). Salamon (2002, pp. 1–2) claimed
that in the United States and other parts of the world a ‘massive proliferation
ha[d] occurred in the tools of public action, in the instruments or means used to
address public problems’. For Salamon, this transformation reflected a paradig-
matic alteration in the nature of public management and policy instruments. The
new governance paradigm reflected a shift from the more hierarchical agencies
and programmes exercising discretion to a proliferation of tools developed and
implemented by organisational networks (Salamon 2002, pp. 9–18). These net-
works will involve public and private actors working together through processes
of negotiation and persuasion, rather than command-and-control.
Héritier (2002) adopted a similarly emphatic tone in arguing that a new mode
of governance was developing in the European context – one focused on non-
binding targets and soft law, subsidiarity and the inclusion of all actors with a
Environmental Politics 165
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
as
t A
ng
lia
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
5:3
6 1
3 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
13
 
stake in the decision. She focused on two types of instruments: actors voluntarily
setting targets, akin to benchmarking where the publication of information gives
incentives to protect reputations and to learn (the EU’s so-called Open Method of
Co-ordination being a good example); voluntary agreements either created by
private organisations on their own or involving public actors to meet negotiated
targets. Héritier argued that such instruments constitute the minority of existing
EU policy instruments. Her findings also suggested that new modes of govern-
ance may have shifted away from hierarchy, but hierarchy continues to play a
significant enabling role in their adoption and in certain situations may even-
tually produce a ‘hybrid’ mode of governance.
Several scholars have sought to articulate this hybridity in more specific
terms. For example, Eberlein and Kerwer (2004, p. 136) helpfully distinguish
between four forms of interaction between traditional tools of government and
new modes of governance: co-existence; fusion; competition; and replacement.
Other types of interaction could be envisaged such as layering, drift, displace-
ment, conversion and exhaustion (Streeck and Thelen 2005). The possibility that
‘old’ and ‘new’ environmental policy instruments co-exist or form hybrids
through the fusion of (elements of) traditional regulation and (elements of)
new modes of environment governance has also been acknowledged by others
(e.g. Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). For example, Jordan et al. (2005) found
that there was little evidence that NEPIs were replacing traditional tools; instead
co-existence seemed to be the most prevalent pattern in European environmental
policy (see also Holzinger et al. 2006). This finding was very much confirmed by
Holzinger et al. (2009, pp. 60–62), who, on the basis of a careful summation of
all the relevant instruments at EU level, concluded that while hierarchal govern-
ance had witnessed a relative decline, it remained the dominant mode of
governance.
Policy instruments: what has been achieved and where next?
Our broad conclusion is that a policy instrument perspective has led to significant
new empirical insights into the realpolitik of governing in the twenty-first
century. It has reaffirmed that policy instruments are not technical devices devoid
of politics. Instrument choices are anything but epiphenomenal; they are often an
important and enduring outcome of intense political struggles to govern society,
and an important generator of new forms of politics and policy at many different
levels of governance (i.e. policy feedback) (Pierson 1993). The sudden emer-
gence of the EU emissions trading scheme and the controversies surrounding its
operation have powerfully confirmed the importance of this point, as has con-
tinuing inability to adopt the policy instruments needed to keep climate change
within tolerable levels.
To answer the question posed in the title of this paper, NEPIs are continuing to
play a significant part in the environmental governance of states, particularly inOECD
countries, but their role is far more constrained by contextual factors – including
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but not limited to the presence of other instruments – than the early literature seemed
to suggest and many of the advocates of NEPIs initially hoped. Academics are still
thinking through the implications of this empirical pattern of ‘bounded’ policy
innovation (Weir 1992). Is it because regulation performs better than some of the
early and somewhat stylised critiques of it suggested? Or is it because the NEPIs are
not as effective as their proponents claimed? Or is it because thinking in mono-
instrumental terms was always artificial and that, in reality, instruments tend to
cohere in much more messy ‘packages’ that require careful and ongoing manage-
ment (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998)? These questions are very topical, parti-
cularly in the current era of austerity-driven deregulation, on which more below.
The mismatch between academic debate about instruments and everyday
practices therefore remains, although it is not nearly as stark as it once was,
particularly with respect to particular instruments such as eco-taxation and
emissions trading. In fact these instruments now have their own constituencies
of specialists, which span the policy and academic worlds. Crucially, these
constituencies draw on many disciplines – law, politics and policy, as well as
economics. There is, though, a lurking sense in which scholars of public policy
and governance are still not as heavily integrated into these constituencies as
they could and perhaps should be. After all, the failure of high profile NEPIs
such as the voluntary agreement with EU car manufacturers, the struggle to get
emissions trading adopted in Australia (Bailey et al. 2012) or the problems
afflicting the EU emissions trading scheme, are largely to do with highly
politicised issues of policy (re)design Skjaerseth and Wettestad (2009), which
political scientists are uniquely placed to comment on.
Going forward, the research agenda for policy instrument scholars is there-
fore extensively populated with many politically highly relevant items. But, in
order to make their voices better heard, political scientists and public policy
scholars will have to re-double their efforts to find underlying explanations for
the limited uptake and/or unexpected performance of NEPIs, for example by
working more effectively across disciplinary boundaries and by widening the
scope of their empirical work. On this agenda we sense that there are at least five
priorities. The first relates to something that we underlined in our original special
issue, namely the need for systematic, detailed and comparative research on
specific types of instrument. Much of the early literature on environmental
instruments tended to focus on one or two types in a few countries. But this is
no longer sufficient to address new research questions. For example, how much
difference does the design of specific instruments make? And what are the key
political and economic conditions that shape both their adoption and implemen-
tation? By answering them, scholars will be able to furnish a far better under-
standing of the mismatch between high ideals and ‘messy’ practice that first
motivated us a decade or so ago.
A second priority is to secure a more systematic comparison of environ-
mental policy with other policy sectors. Studies by Bähr (2010), Capano et al.
(2012), Héritier and Rhodes (2011) and Kassim and Le Galès (2010) have made
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an extremely useful start, but more systematic comparisons are needed to under-
stand how unique the trends described above are to environmental policy.
Scholars have traditionally viewed environmental policy as an inherently regu-
latory policy sector, dominated by command-and-control regulations in which
national governments and/or the EU stipulate in law detailed standards. Do we
also see similar patterns in other regulatory areas where, perhaps, technological
change and scientific uncertainty are significant? If we consider the other basic
types of policy, do distributive and redistributive policies (e.g. welfare, agricul-
tural) reveal different patterns of policy instrument adoption and governance
mixes, and to what extent do these exert an influence on policy impacts and
outcomes (Bauer et al. 2012)? Finally, is there something particular about policy
instruments (and perhaps governing more generally) which leads politicians to
make inflated claims that end up mismatching with everyday practices? The
limited evidence that we have of the non-use of ‘detector’ (as opposed to
‘effector’) instruments (Hood and Margetts 2007) in formal policymaking,
such as computer models, cost–benefit analysis and scenarios, suggests that
there might well be (Nilsson et al. 2008).
This takes us to a third priority: to understand spatial variations in the (non)
use of policy instruments. Comparing different types of jurisdictions (such as
federal and unitary states and supranational (e.g. the EU) and international
organisations (e.g. the UN)) could generate many new insights into what facil-
itates and what hinders adoption. As the sections above have detailed, there is a
substantial literature investigating the role of ‘context’, but the tendency has been
for comparative research to focus on similar political systems within an OECD,
and particularly a European or US context. However, Breton et al. (2007) have
offered a hugely ambitious survey of environmental governance patterns, includ-
ing instrument usage, for a range of non-OECD countries. The main aim of their
volume was to understand the role of federal structures in shaping environmental
governance, and specific analysis of instruments was somewhat lacking. Current
shifts in economic power towards the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in
particular make it more urgent to research instrument patterns in rapidly and less
rapidly developing countries. Will leaps in economic development in these areas
be matched by an increasing use of innovative environmental regulation and new
modes of (environmental) governance? How far does the influence of the diffu-
sion of ideas about NEPIs extend to these countries? How much difference do
regional and international organisations make to the adoption and implementa-
tion of NEPIs? These important questions still await answers.
Fourthly, there is a need for more work on the evaluation of instruments, both
singly and in combination, and especially in areas of society-led steering
(Prakash and Gugerty 2010, Bulkeley and Jordan 2012). Put very simply, in
some contexts NEPIs do seem to work, but in many others their performance has
fallen well short of expectations. Instead of adopting a rather static perspective
which simply describes the presence and/or absence of particular instruments of
governing, future work could usefully explore the causal relationship between
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policy instruments and outcomes ‘on the ground’, including technological inno-
vation (for a good example, see Enevoldsen 2005 and Kemp and Pontoglio
2011). If, to paraphrase Rhodes (1997, p. 53), ‘the mix between the modes is
what really matters’, we need to know what forms of governing lead to what
outcomes, whilst ensuring that they all remain legitimate and publicly accoun-
table. The problem here is that evaluation is very much the poor relation of
environmental policy analysis (Huitema et al. 2011). Some attempts have, how-
ever, been made to identify salient evaluation criteria (Mickwitz 2003); the
challenge is to employ them to explore the ‘twist’ that different instruments
impart on the operation of policy programmes (Salamon 2002, p. 2). There is
certainly ample scope to relate these questions to work on policy feedback
(Bauer et al. 2012): how policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent policies
and politics (Pierson 1993). In other areas of public policy, analysts are begin-
ning to investigate what design features (the scope of calibration of instruments
for example) are more likely to ensure the political (as opposed to environmen-
tal) sustainability of different policy interventions (Patashnik 2008, p. 3). These
are debates that would benefit from a policy instruments perspective.
Finally, governance is not the only theoretical topic that stands to benefit
from an empirical focus on instruments; so too can the theory of instruments. At
present there is no single ‘theory of policy instruments’. Indeed the policy
instruments literature has often side-stepped debates about explanation in favour
of definitions and classifications (Jordan et al. 2012b). Here we have explored
particularly two theoretical sub-fields, relating to transfer/diffusion and institu-
tional context. Both have strong merits, but it is arguable that core elements of
the policy instrument selection process remain poorly explored (Peters 2002).
Works such as Pedersen (2007) and Daugbjerg and Svendsen (2001) are sugges-
tive of new and fruitful lines of inquiry, in asking whether the vital motivator is
in fact symbolic (giving the impression to core constituencies that something is
being done), rather than policy problem solving. Related to that, we know
relatively little about the reform and possible dismantling of existing instruments
after they have been adopted (Bauer et al. 2013) under the banner of ‘better
regulation’. We still do not know whether these are really generating substantive
changes in instruments (and thence outcomes), or whether they are essentially
symbolic (Bauer et al. 2012). Our broader point, though, is that it is probably
more productive in the short term to build an instruments perspective into
existing and well-tested theories of the policy process than seek to develop an
entirely separate ‘theory of policy instruments’ (Jordan et al. 2012b).
To conclude, the twenty-first century shows every sign of being another
‘century of new instruments’, although admittedly it is difficult to predict pre-
cisely what future instruments will look like (although we sense that they will
broadly approximate to the three main modes described above) or the specific
kinds of politics that will emerge around them. We are quietly confident about
this prediction because the choice and application of different policy instruments
has always constituted the very essence of governing (Hood 2007, pp. 142–143),
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one of the most extensively debated and discussed topics in the whole of the
social sciences.
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